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abstract: For the purpose of this analysis, risk assessment becomes 
the primary term and risk management the secondary term. The concept 
of risk management as a primary term is based upon a false ontology. 
Risk management implies that risk is already there, not created by the 
decision, but lies already inherent in the situation that the decision sets 
into motion. The risk that already exists in the objective situation simply 
needs to be “managed”. By considering risk assessment as the primary 
term, the ethics of responsibility for risking the lives of others, the envi-
ronment and future generations in the first place comes into the forefront. 
The issue of risk heeding is especially important as it highlights the need 
to pay attention to warnings of danger and to take action to redress 
problems before disasters occur. In this paper, the decision making that 
led to the choice of technology utilized and the implementation of such 
technology in the case of the space shuttle Challenger disaster will be used 
as a model to illustrate the need to take ethical factors into account when 
making decisions regarding the safety of technological systems and the 
Ramon Llull Journal_07.indd   93 30/05/16   11:56
94 raMoN llull JourNal of aPPlIeD ethIcs 2016. Issue 7 PP. 93-00
heeding of danger warnings. While twenty-five years separates the decision 
to launch the Challenger and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant dis-
aster, the lessons of the Challenger disaster are still to be learned.
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INtroDuctIoN
THE CONSEqUENCES OF UNETHICAL RISk ASSESSMENT  
AND NOT HEEDING RISk WARNINGS
What is often not understood is the role that risk assessment and not 
heeding risk warnings play in decision making that sets technological 
disasters in motion, or creates conditions that make technological disaster 
more probable and most importantly, more consequential in terms of the 
populations that are affected when such disasters occur. This is all the 
more compelling when one considers that one-third to one-half of fatali-
ties from disasters are children.1
The approach taken here is a universal, all-hazards approach to 
disasters.2 With the potential of mega-disasters, such as another Fuku-
shima Nuclear Disaster, which could have global implications, the need 
for preventing such disasters in the first place requires greater attention 
to disaster risk assessment and disaster risk heeding prior to the occur-
rence of the disaster.3 Such attention to the prevention of disaster in the 
1 “Disaster Risk Management for Health: Child Health,” World Health Organi-
zation, accessed September 15, 2015, http://www.who.int/hac/events/drm_fact_
sheet_child_health.pdf
2 An example of a multi-hazards approach is the one taken by the government of 
Pakistan in 2006 in ‘Strengthening National Capacities for Multi Hazard Early Warn-
ing and Response System’. In that report, the importance of warnings is highlighted. 
Cf., accessed September 15, 2015, http://www.pmd.gov.pk/Establishment%20of%20
Early%20Warning%20System.pdf
3 In a talk given at the East-West Center on August 18, 2013, Professor of Govern-
ment and North Korean expert Victor Cha, stated that the nuclear reactor being built 
in North Korea had no sign of meeting international safety standards.
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first place is a useful complement to the constructive research on the 
reduction of the risk of harmful consequences of disaster after disasters 
occur. The Asia Pacific region is the most disaster prone region in the 
world. The Hyogo report has placed special emphasis on disaster preven-
tion.4 Whose responsibility is disaster prevention? In a word, everyone’s. 
Responsibility is not reduced by being shared. In the pithy dictum of the 
World Health Organization, ‘Disaster risk management for health is 
everybody’s business’.5 When one considers that those most affected by 
disasters are children, elderly females, and those who suffer from eco-
nomic poverty the ethics of disaster prevention comes strongly to the 
forefront. The issue of risk heeding is especially important as it highlights 
the need to pay attention to warnings of danger and to take action to 
redress problems before disasters occur. In this paper, the decision mak-
ing that led to the choice of technology utilized and the implementation 
of such technology in the case of the space shuttle Challenger disaster 
will be used as a model to illustrate the need to take ethical factors into 
account when making decisions regarding the safety of technological 
systems and the heeding of danger warnings. While twenty-five years 
separates the decision to launch the Challenger and the Fukushima Dai-
ichi nuclear plant disaster, the lessons of the Challenger disaster are still 
to be learned. The case of the space shuttle Challenger disaster, while 
itself not a case of wide-risk technological decision making, is a classic case 
of disaster so well documented that it can serve as a model of the kinds of 
mistakes that can be avoided so as to prevent disasters in the future, such 
as the Fukushima nuclear plant disaster. The space shuttle Challenger 
disaster well illustrates the contrast that exists between general, unknown 
risk and specifically foreknown risk, for example, the faulty and danger-
ous O-rings (known in advance to exist by managers and engineers though 
not by the principal risk takers) prior to the decision to launch the space 
shuttle Challenger. It is invaluable to examine this case in some detail so 
as to learn not to confuse general unknown risk with specifically fore-
4 Cf., The Hyogo Framework for Action in Asia and the Pacific regional synthe-
sis report, 2010-2013, accessed September 15, 2015, http://www.unisdr.org/we/
inform/publications/32851
5 “Disaster Risk Management for Health: Overview,” World Health Organization, 
accessed September 15, 2015, http://www.who.int/hac/events/drm_fact_sheet_over-
view.pdf. This phrase is a current version of the phrase I coined in my 1993 book on 
global disasters: ‘The buck stops here and it stops everyplace else as well’. Cf., Robert 
Elliott Allinson, Global Disasters, Prentice-Hall.
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known risk in order to show how very important the concept of ethical 
responsibility is. It is the contention of this paper that the understanding 
of the ethics of risk is crucial to the prevention of technological disasters 
in the future.
PrevIous coNcePts aND clarIfIcatIoNs
NATURAL AND MAN-MADE DISASTERS
The line between natural and man-made disasters is permeable since 
it can well be argued that decisions to locate hazardous technology near 
to areas in which the effects of disasters cannot be properly contained can 
turn a natural disaster into a (larger) man-made one. The International 
Federation of the Red Cross has estimated that between 1998 and 2007, 
there were nearly 3,200 technological disasters, including chemical disas-
ters, with 100,000 people killed and 2 million people affected.6 The 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor disaster which occurred on March 
11, 2011 is an example of the harm that is done to human beings when 
corporations do not heed risk assessment notifications and as a result, 
preventable disasters occur. While the language of “weak signals” has not 
been utilized in accounts describing this disaster, either to describe the 
notification or the lack of heeding of the warning, the warning issued was 
not heeded. If the warning had been heeded, the Fukushima disaster could 
have been prevented (even though the earthquake and tsunami could not). 
It is important to take note that, by definition, a signal is not weak when 
human lives are at stake. In this case, an electrical company had control 
over the risky technology that affected the lives of hundreds of thousands 
of people in the Pacific Basin. Those who hold control over technology 
that can adversely affect large population centers need to be held to a 
higher standard of moral accountability. According to the Executive 
Summary of the Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commis-
sion appointed by the National Diet of Japan, chaired by Kiyoshi Kurok-
awa, former president of the Science Council of Japan, ‘It was a pro-
6 “Humanitarian Health Action: Disaster Risk Management for Health Facts 
Sheet,” World Health Organization, accessed September 15, 2015, http://www.who.
int/hac/techguidance/preparedness/factsheets/en/ 
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foundly manmade disaster that could and should have been prevented.’7 
Naoto Kan, Japan’s former Prime Minister stated that the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear plant should not have been built so close to the ocean.8
In financial terms alone, the cost of the Fukushima disaster will be 
enormous. The Japanese government has already allocated $15 billion 
for decontaminating the area and complete decommissioning of the plant 
is expected to take 40 years. According to the Japan Center for Eco-
nomic Research, decontamination costs alone could be $600 billion.9
In humanitarian terms, human costs are immeasurable when one 
considers the forced evacuation of 150,000-300,000 people, forced to 
move multiple times, many never to return to their homes, resulting in 
increased stress and health risks and deaths among those who were seri-
ously ill.10 Of 328 senior evacuees, 75 died within one year due to 
changes in living environment, 2.7 times higher than the national aver-
age for senior deaths. According to the National Institute of Health’s 
(NIH) National Cancer Institute, radiation emission levels are approach-
ing those of Chernobyl where new cases of thyroid cancer are still ap-
pearing at an undiminished rate in the most heavily affected areas of the 
Ukraine, Belarus and Russia.11 According to the National Institute of 
Radiological Sciences (NIRS), children in Fukushima prefecture received 
lifetime thyroid gland doses of internal radiation.12 According to Science, 
40% of the fish caught off Fukushima 12 months after the disaster have 
too much cesium to be safe to eat. Since cesium has a half-life of 30 years, 
this means that it will take 60 years to dissipate.13 Cesium has even been 
7 Yoko Wakatsuki and Jethro Mullen, “Japanese parliament report: Fukushima 
nuclear crisis was ‘man-made,’” CNN, July 5, 2012, accessed September 15, 2015, 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/05/world/asia/japan-fukushima-report
8 “Japan woefully unprepared for nuclear disaster, ex-PM,” CTV News, February 
17, 2012, accessed September 15, 2015, http://www.ctvnews.ca/japan-woefully-
unprepared-for-nuclear-disaster-ex-pm-1.769980
9 Mari Saito, Kiyoshi Takenaka and James Topham, “Insight: Japan’s “Long War” 
to shut down Fukushima,” March 8, 2013, accessed September 15, 2015, www.reuters.
com/article/2013/03/08/us-japan-fukushima-idUSBRE92417Y20130308
10 James M. Acton and Mark Hibbs, “Fukushima Could Have Been Prevented,” 
NY Times, March 9, 2012, accessed September 15, 2015, http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/03/10/opinion/fukushima-could-have-been-prevented.html?_r=0
11 New Scientist, March 24, 2011. 
12 Yuri Otawa, Asahi Shimbun, July 11, 2012, p. 27.
13 Hiroko Tabuchi, “Fish Off Japan’s Coast Said to Contain Elevated Levels of 
Cesium,” NY Times, October 25, 2012, accessed September 15, 2015, http://www.
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found in blue-fin tuna off America’s West Coast, 6,000 miles from Ja-
pan.14 While some might play down the risk of such levels of radioactive 
substance, one must remember that x-ray doses thought to be safe 78 
years ago are now deemed intolerably risky.15
According to a previous study, preliminary computer simulations 
conducted in 2008 that suggested tsunami risk to the plant were not fol-
lowed up and were only reported to the Nuclear Industrial Safety 
Agency (NISA) on March 7, 2011. NISA in turn failed to review simu-
lation conducted by Tepco. What needs to be emphasized is that these 
failures to follow up risk assessments and report safety hazards were not 
due to bureaucratic stovepiping, that is, slowdowns and stoppages due to 
being held up by bureaucratic regulations and hierarchical structures, but 
were failures in moral responsibility. If one examines bureaucratic stove-
piping on a case to case basis, one will discover that each case involves a 
failure in moral responsibility.
SAFETy FIRST
One takes life and death risks with others with their consent, as with 
surgery, only when it is necessary to promote or safeguard health. The 
issue of cosmetic surgery may be an exception, but in this case, consent is 
given in advance. In this discussion, which refers to exposing others to 
risk of life owing to decisions made to employ wide-risk technology, life 
takes precedence over risk. Ethical risk assessment recognizes the dignity 
of all human beings, their basic right to life and subsistence and their basic 
right to safety, that is, protection from known risks. The safety of human 
beings and the future environment of human beings is our utmost con-
sideration. This is not to say that it is our only consideration, but that it 
is our utmost consideration. It could be argued, for example, that risks 
can be taken in the interest of public welfare, but this is a sticky wicket. 
nytimes.com/2012/10/26/world/asia/fish-off-fukushima-japan-show-elevated-levels-
of-cesium.html
14 Alicia Chang, “Radioactive Bluefin Tuna: Japan Nuclear Plant Contaminated 
Fish Found Off California Coast,” Huffington Post, May 28, 2012, accessed Septem-
ber 15, 2015, www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/28/radioactive-bluefin-tuna-japan-
fukushima-california_n_1551431.html
15 W. W. Lowrance, Of acceptable risk: Science and the determination of safety. 
Los Altos, Ca.: William Kaufmann, Inc., 1976, p. 9.
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Who is to define public welfare? Safety may be defined as the protection 
of human life and limb and the environment against known risks that 
threaten human health, survival and the survival of a sustainable environ-
ment. This discussion is not meant to apply to cases in which careful and 
thoroughgoing advanced preparation has been taken to minimize the risks 
taken and to measure the benefits accruing versus the possible dangers 
posed. For example, this does not mean that no risks are ever taken. It 
means that there is a safety first priority to protect human life. For exam-
ple, riding a bicycle poses risks to the rider. Requiring that bicyclists wear 
helmets protects riders from brain damage. In the case of automobile 
driving, one distinguishes between reckless driving and driving within safe 
limits. Automobile driving presents risks to drivers and to others. Requir-
ing a safety belt is an example of taking a measure to protect life. Auto-
mobiles, in some states of the United States, must pass annual safety in-
spections. A safety first priority value may be defined as taking every 
feasible safeguard to protect human health, survival and the survival of a 
sustainable environment. A safety first priority also includes the obligation 
to inform risk takers of the known risks that they are taking and to receive 
their informed consent either directly or, when direct consent is imprac-
tical, through their elected representatives. In the case of the space shuttle 
Challenger disaster, the five astronauts and two civilians on board were 
not informed of the known risk (with the faulty 0-rings) they were taking. 
At least three of the astronauts were breathing when the crew compart-
ment had separated from the orbiter. There was no explosion. The spec-
tacular smoke plume was due to the chemical reaction of the hydrogen 
colliding with the oxygen. Three personal egress packs were recovered 
activated after the blast. Thus, it was entirely possible that the astronauts 
and civilians could have been saved with an abort system. This is an ex-
ample of not following a safety first priority. On all previous and subse-
quent flights, space shuttles were equipped with abort systems.
GENERAL UNkNOWN RISk vERSUS SPECIFIC  
AND FOREkNOWN RISk
There is a confusion that is frequently made between general and un-
known risk that is operative in the universe and any specific risk that is 
known in advance to exist. For example, whenever one gets out of one’s 
bed in the morning, one may trip, fall, crack one’s skull and have a concus-
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sion. This is the general and unknown risk that is operative in the universe. 
We should not construe risk in these terms as this kind of risk exists, for 
the most part, outside of human control and intervention. Every human 
being exposes herself or himself to general, unknown risks on a daily basis. 
The risks which concern us are lethal risks that are known or should be 
known to decision-makers who employ wide-risk technology which 
places others under the lethal risks that the decision makers have created.
the case
THE CASE OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER AS  
AN OBJECT LESSON
One can argue that whenever an astronaut goes into space, that astro-
naut is subject to that general, unknown, universal-style risk of space 
travel. This, however, is not comparable to an astronaut going into spa- 
ce equipped with the full knowledge of the existence of a real, specific, 
pre-existing, and correctable mechanical fault that could be potentially 
fatal. NASA never told the congressional committees charged with over-
seeing the shuttle program about the escalating dangers of the O-ring 
problems. In the Presidential Commission report:
Chairman Rogers raised the question of whether any astronaut office rep-
resentative was aware [of the O-ring problem]’. Weitz, [an astronaut’s repre-
sentative] answered: “We were not aware of any concern with the O-rings, let 
alone the effect of weather on the O-rings.16
Two years after the horrific event, when the official, U. S. government 
committee on Shuttle Criticality, Review and Hazard Analysis examined 
the risk that had been taken in launching the Challenger, the Chairman 
of that committee wrote in the very first paragraph of chapter four of 
their report, entitled “Risk Assessment and Risk Management”:
16 Robert Elliott Allinson, Saving Human Lives, Lessons in Management Ethics, 
Dordrecht: Springer, 2005, pp. 184-5, 187. These pages in the secondary source cited 
refer to a number of sources that corroborate the testimony of Weitz, the astronaut’s 
representative, that was given before the Rogers’ Commission, that the astronauts did 
not know of any problems with the O–rings. 
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Almost lost in the strong public reaction to the Challenger failure was the 
inescapable fact that major advances in mankind’s capability to explore and 
operate in space – indeed, even in routine, atmospheric flight – will only be 
accomplished in the face of risk.
And, later, in the body of that same report, the Committee wrote: 
“The risks of space flight must be accepted by those who are asked to 
participate in each flight”…17
It is rather easy to spot the fallacy that is being committed in this 
case. It is the fallacy of equating a general unknown risk (space flight 
in general) with a specifically foreknown fatal risk (the flawed design 
of the O-rings about which the senior engineer Roger Boisjoly had is-
sued red flagged warnings).18 When one examines the Challenger case 
more closely, one discovers that there was no need to choose the 
technology that was chosen in the first place. The risky technology in 
this case was the engineering design of the O-rings. Of four designs 
submitted, the one chosen was the least safe (and the cheapest). This 
choice was a case of reckless epistemological assessment on the part 
of the managers who chose this design that was an initiating cause of 
the Challenger disaster, and not the fact that they were obliged to 
employ a risky design in order to venture into space. It was an example 
of ethically insensitive decision making and reckless assessment. The 
design itself was risky. Why? This decision to place cost ahead of 
safety is an example of ethical misjudgment. There was no necessity to 
choose this particular design. Alternative designs were available. The 
O-ring design of giant rubber gaskets keeping combustible hot gases 
from leaking out, in actual fact, ranked fourth out of four submitted 
engineering designs and, according to an important article co-written 
by Trudy Bell, Senior Editor of the engineering journal, IEEE Spectrum 
and Karl Esch: the selection of this design was the chief cause of the 
17 Preface by Alton Slay, Chairman, Committee on Shuttle Criticality, Review 
and Hazard Analysis, Post-Challenger Evaluation of Space Shuttle Risk Assessment 
and Management, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1988, p. v; p. 33.
18 Robert Elliott Allinson, Saving Human Lives, Lessons in Management Ethics, 
Dordrecht: Springer, 2005, p. 138. Boisjoly’s awe striking memorandum can be found 
in The Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Chal-
lenger Accident (popularly known as the Rogers Report), Internal correspondence 
and memoranda, Appendix D, Washington, D. C., GPO, 1986, p. 249.
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Challenger disaster.19 For the next space flight, this design was replaced 
with a safer design. One of the original proposed designs, the McDonnell-
Douglass proposal, actually anticipated the technical cause of the Chal-
lenger disaster in that it provided for a burn through wire that would 
have sensed O-ring leakage, then triggered booster thrust termination and 
the orbiter’s abort rocket escape system. The McDonnell-Douglas pro-
posed design included an abort rocket escape system. Their proposal of 
an orbiter incorporated a practical abort capability that would have 
protected the shuttle crew and passengers during all phases of the mission.
ProPosal
RISk ASSESSMENT AND RISk MANAGEMENT IN CONTExTS  
IN WHICH DECISION-MAkERS PLACE OTHERS, THE ENvIRONMENT 
AND FUTURE GENERATIONS (OEF) IN HARM’S WAy
While the phrase “risk management” is employed with ethical respon-
sibility when applied to reducing the consequences of disasters, the present 
context for the analysis of the terms “risk assessment” and “risk manage-
ment” is one in which decisions are taken which place the environment, 
future generations, and human beings other than the decision-makers, in 
harm’s way. For the purpose of this analysis, risk assessment becomes 
the primary term and risk management the secondary term. The concept 
of risk management as a primary term is based upon a false ontology. 
Risk management implies that risk is already there, not created by the 
decision, but lies already inherent in the situation that the decision sets 
into motion. The risk that already exists in the objective situation simply 
needs to be “managed”. By considering risk assessment as the primary 
term, the ethics of responsibility for risking the lives of others, the envi-
ronment and future generations in the first place comes into the forefront. 
While the ethics of responsibility will also be involved in managing the 
risk to OEF (others, environment and future generations) created by the 
initial decision, the initial decision that places others and the planet in 
harm’s way is not given the same amount of attention that is given to the 
19 Robert Elliott Allinson, ‘Risk Management: demythologizing its belief founda-
tions,’ International Journal of Risk Assessment and Management, Volume 7, No. 
3, 2007, p. 302.
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management of risk, once that risk has been created.20 In the case of the 
Challenger, risk management was also unethical. Previous launches had 
included pressurized space suits, escape bolt hatches, and parachute descent 
systems. All of these may well have saved the lives of the astronauts and 
civilians who were alive and breathing at the moment of impact with the 
ocean floor. Whether one categorizes this failure to provide life support 
systems as an ethical failure of risk assessment or an ethical failure of risk 
management is a matter of semantics. Strictly speaking, as will be discussed 
below, it falls under ethically faulty risk assessment since the risk was 
taken at the time of the design of the space shuttle and was part of the 
initial design. Once the space shuttle was operational, there was no pos-
sibility of managing the risk that had been created.
WHAT CONSTITUTES ACCEPTABLE RISk?
In the case of the Challenger, Professor Feynman, the renowned 
physicist who was a member of the Presidential Commission, was aston-
ished at the very concept of ‘acceptable risk’. What, after all, constitutes 
taking an “acceptable” risk to human life? Vision Zero is a policy for 
traffic safety that was adopted by the Swedish Parliament in 1997. The 
policy states that it is ethically unacceptable for people to die or be seri-
ously injured in the road transport system.21 This emphasis on ethical 
premises is new to the field of traffic safety and may serve as a principle 
that can be exported to the field of disaster prevention in general.
When one is considering what constitutes an acceptable risk, one must 
take epistemological and ethical responsibility. This responsibility is not 
abrogated even if a flight is considered experimental. It is crucial to con-
sider the point that consent must be obtained prior to risk distribution. 
It is also crucial to consider that known risk (e.g., known avoidable 
danger with the O-rings) must be communicated to the risk-takers if 
consent obtained is to be informed. Indeed, in this case, since the dangers 
20 The U.S. government is currently teaching the terms and definitions for the 
proper understanding of risk that the present author originated in its educational train-
ing courses for FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Association. 
21 Cf., Jessica Nihlen Fahlquist, ‘Responsibility ascriptions and Vision Zero,’ Ac-
cident Analysis & Prevention,’ 38 (2006), pp. 1113-1118. Norway adopted a similar 
version of Vision Zero in 2001. 
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with the O-rings were red-flagged, under these conditions consent should 
not even be sought in the first place. Finally, safety systems such as escape 
bolt hatches, space pressure suits, parachute descent systems, must be 
provided to make even informed consent a viable option.
Epistemological responsibility for risk assessment entails taking proper 
scientific measurements regarding the quantitative part of risk assessment. 
Ethical responsibility for risk assessment made with the consequence of 
being the criterion of placing others at lethal risk requires the evaluation of 
whether a risk is morally acceptable and falls outside the domain of scien-
tific method proper. Scientific method when applied to human beings is 
not ethically neutral; decisions to apply the results of scientific method to 
impact upon human life do require moral judgments. Truth is a value and 
scientific truth is the value that is intrinsic to scientific inquiry. Ethical 
value is the kind of value which must be taken into account whenever 
scientific method or the results of that method in terms of scientific technol-
ogy is applied to human beings. The calculation of the risk is purely quan-
titative and does not take into account the qualitative nature of the factors 
in the equation. Since the calculation of the risk is mathematical with respect 
to the factors calculated, the decision to take risks (without consent) with 
the human lives in question is an extra-scientific decision. While the calcu-
lation of the risk is purely scientific, it can become ethically relevant. It 
becomes ethically relevant when one decides to apply the calculation to take 
risks with the human lives in question without their consent. This decision 
makes use of scientific calculation, but the decision to go ahead with the 
engineering is not a scientific decision; it is a moral one.
Much of the discussion concerning risk assessment and risk manage-
ment appears to treat the quantitative measurement of risk assessment 
as relatively unproblematic whereas the qualitative assessment of risk 
assessment is treated as highly problematic. But, is even the quantitative 
measurement of risk assessment unproblematic?22 How does one carry 
out the quantitative part of risk assessment?23 In the specific case from 
22 Cf., Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Bridging the Two Cultures of Risk Analysis,’ Risk Analy-
sis, 3, (2), 1993, pp. 123-129.
23 Leaded gas was announced as toxic by the assistant surgeon general of the 
United States in 1922, but it was not outlawed until 1996. Cf., Rosner and Markow-
itz, ‘A Gift of G-d’, The Public Health Controversy over Lead-Additives,’ American 
Journal of Public Health 75, pp. 344-352.
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which we will draw most of our information here, the launching of the 
U. S. space shuttle, Challenger, the action to be taken was conside- 
red to be an “acceptable risk”. The question of “acceptable risk” was 
applied to the action to be taken, not to the decision to take the action. 
Had the notion of “acceptable risk” been applied to the decision to 
launch, ethical responsibility for the decision would have fallen more 
directly on the shoulders of the decision makers. When one of the four 
managers who overrode the unanimous decision of 14 engineers and 
managers not to launch was asked at the Presidential Commission hear-
ings, whether the phrase ‘loss of mission and life’ had a negative con-
notation, the answer given by the manager, Larry Mulloy, was that such 
a description had no negative connotation and simply meant that you 
have a single point failure with no back-up and the failure of that single 
system is catastrophic.24 Mulloy’s answer is limited to the failure of the 
mission and is not fully ethically responsible since it does not take into 
account the loss of life.
EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASIS OF RISk ASSESSMENT: SUBJECTIvE 
JUDGMENT vERSUS PERFORMANCE DATA
Risk assessment in the case of the decision to launch the Challenger 
was based on using a failure modes effects analysis. Cook, one of the few 
if not the only source on the Challenger who goes into detail on this 
point, points to one study, conducted in 1984, which concluded that the 
chance of a Solid Rocket Booster explosion was one in thirty-five launch-
es.25 Nevertheless, the Marshall managers spoke of “acceptable risk”. If 
you “lost” one astronaut, that was “data” in the risk equation. Some loss 
of a human life was thus considered acceptable.  A team of statisticians 
formed by the National Research Council to follow up on the commis-
sion report analyzed the same data and estimated a “gambling probabil-
ity” of 14 per cent for a catastrophic O-ring failure at a temperature of 
31 degrees.26 It is not as if one can design a system in which there is ab-
24 Richard C. Cook, Challenger Revealed, An Insider’s Account of How the 
Reagan Administration Caused the Greatest Tragedy of the Space Age, New York: 
Avalon, 2006, p. 243. 
25 Ibid., p. 356.
26 Ibid., p. 171.
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solutely no risk. The point is to design a system in which precautions are 
taken with the view that a loss of life is unacceptable.
In 1977, NASA commissioned a group called the Wiggins Group to 
study the possibility of flight failures and by examining data for all previ-
ous space launches, a likely failure rate of one in fifty-seven was derived. 
According to Cook, NASA complained that many of the launch vehicles 
the Wiggins group included were not similar enough to the Challenger 
shuttle to be part of the data base. So, Wiggins changed the probable 
failure rate to one in 100. Professor Feynman, a member of the Rogers 
Commission, calculated the odds at one in 100. Another study con-
ducted by the Air Force placed the likely failure rate for the shuttle in a 
similar range to the Wiggins analysis. According to Cook, none of these 
studies were publicized and most of the newspaper reporters who covered 
NASA most likely had never heard of them. When NASA was forced 
to arrive at an official number, their chief engineer came up with the 
infamous and arbitrary estimate of one in 100,000. As Cook put it, ‘At 
a rate of twenty-four launches per year, this meant that NASA expected 
the shuttle to fail catastrophically only once every 4,167 years.27 The 
possible incidence of occurrence was therefore negligible. By presenting, 
not calculating, the incidence of risk as virtually non-existent, it was pos-
sible to immunize oneself against the realities of the consequences of the 
risk. One could then make a decision to risk other people’s lives, because 
statistical probability had eliminated the problematic dimension of the 
risk factor, the consequences, from the equation. When a figure is used, 
such as one in 100,000, one might assume that this is a calculated risk 
since it is put in the mathematical language of percentages and statistics. 
But, this was not a “calculated risk” at all, but fantasy parading as math-
ematics. A figure picked out of thin air had granted the decision makers 
moral immunity. Of course, the space shuttle program was considered 
experimental. However, this does not imply that the astronauts should 
not have been informed of the known risks that they were taking.
The Nobel laureate physicist Richard Feynman, was shocked to learn 
that NASA management had claimed that the risk factor of a launch crash 
was 1 in 100,000 which they had arrived at without relying upon any 
actual past performance data. If one calculated risk based upon actual past 
performance data, the risk was, according to Professor Feynman, a mem-
27 Ibid., pp. 126-7.
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ber of the Rogers Commission, 1 in 100.28 According to Professor Feyn-
man, while management, in defending its decision to launch, pointed to 
the risk involved as being 1 in 100,000, this figure of 1 in 100,000 was not 
based on previous performance data. If one took the actual performance 
data of rocket engines in the past, as Professor Feynman did, the risk was 
far greater. When one does this, one can more clearly consider the case of 
the possibility of incidence versus the actuality of consequence. Does one 
wish to risk the lives of the astronauts and the civilians when the chance 
of their death is 1 in 100? Unless the risk estimates are based on past per-
formance data as a data base, according to Feynman, ‘it’s all tomfoolery’.29 
There is no reason why we should not learn from the lessons of the Chal-
lenger disaster to generalize sound conclusions concerning the method we 
should employ when engaging in risk assessment. Even if we take under 
consideration that the shuttle was conceived of as experimental, it does not 
follow that the possibility of loss of life due to risk factors not known by 
those placed under the risk is acceptable. Being informed of the risk and 
being provided with technology that provided escape from the risk would 
go far to making risk more acceptable. It is possible for a manned space 
program to exist, as it did prior to the launch of the Challenger, with 
escape systems in place to safeguard the lives of the astronauts.
In 1991, the probability for a meltdown in a nuclear plant was calcu-
lated by some scholars to be one in 10,000 years.30 The quantitative and 
hence scientific appearance of probability figures may disguise the fact 
that such figures may lack any sound scientific basis. In 1974, nearly 
twenty years earlier, the Atomic Energy Commission had stated that 
“The most likely core melt accident would occur on the average of one 
every 17,000 years per plant.”31 The AEC stated that “While the study 
has presented the estimated risks from nuclear power plant accidents and 
compared them with other risks in our society, it has made no judgment 
on the acceptability of nuclear risks. Although the study believes nuclear 
accident risks are very small, the judgment as to what level of risk soci-
ety should accept is a broader one than can be made here.”32 A probabil-
28 Ibid., p. 183.
29 Ibid., p. 183.
30 Alvira Kreimer and Mohan Munasinghe, eds., Managing Natural Disasters 
and the Environment, World Bank, 1991, p. 109.
31 William W. Lowrance, Of Acceptable Risk: Science and the Determination of 
Safety, Los Altos, Ca.,1976, William Kaufmann, Inc., p. 73.
32 Ibid., p. 77.
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ity figure by itself does not carry with it ethical acceptability. That is a 
separate judgment altogether. The AEC went on to state that “For ac-
cidents involving 1,000 or more fatalities the number is 1 in 1,000,000 
or once in a million years. Interestingly, this is just the probability that a 
meteor would strike a U.S. population center and cause 1,000 fatalities.”33
EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITy FOR RISk 
MANAGEMENT SAFETy MARGINS
Major General Kutnya, Director of Space Systems and Command 
Control, USAF, Air Force General and Presidential Commission member, 
argued that the O-ring evidence was analogous to evidence that an airliner 
wing was about to fall off. Professor Feynman pointed out with respect 
to Diane Vaughan’s contention that there was a ‘safety factor of three’, 
that because in previous cases the O-ring had burned only one third of the 
way through, that did not prove that there was a safety factor of three. If 
we merge the O-ring and the airplane wing examples, the argument of 
General Kutnya, and Professor Feynman, is that if the wings of an aircraft 
have burned one-third of the way through, that did not mean that they 
had a two-thirds safety margin. If a part that is designed to hold back in-
flammatory gases is weakened by one-third, then its capacity to hold those 
gases back is diminished by one-third. In such a weakened state, the mar-
gin between its holding up and its caving in to the pressure of the gases is 
seriously undermined. It is not that it possesses a two-thirds safety margin; 
it is that one-third of its capacity is diminished. It may not be capable of 
standing up to a heavy load. Its safety margin at that point may be zero.
In Professor Feynman’s words:
If a bridge is designed to withstand a certain load … it may be designed for 
the materials used to actually stand up under three times the load … But if the 
expected load comes on to the new bridge and a crack appears in a beam, this 
is a failure of the design. The O-rings of the solid rocket boosters were not 
designed to erode. Erosion was a clue that something was wrong. Erosion was 
not something from which safety could be inferred.34
33 Ibid., p. 73.
34 Ibid., p. 183.
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If we are to generalize from these arguments to future scenarios of risk 
assessment, we must be careful never to consider problems that develop 
as evidence that the design is still basically sound. Problems are danger 
signals, not signals that everything is fine. When safety is compromised, 
it does not signify that there is still a viable margin of safety. When 
safety is weakened, what we have left is not a state of safety conditions 
which are a little less than perfect; we have conditions which are not safe. 
At the very least, one needs to be informed of unsafe effects just as pos-
sible side effects are listed for medicines so that the risks taken are known 
rather than unknown. When one takes those medicines for which side-
effects are made known to the patient, one is aware of the risk factors.
Professor Feynman, in his famous, improvised experiment during the 
televised hearings, dropped a piece of the rubber O-ring into a glass of ice 
water obtained from a waiter and demonstrated that it had no resiliency 
left to it at a freezing temperature and therefore could not expand to 
contain the superhot inflammable gases. Considering the intriguing discus-
sion of different definitions of ‘resilience’, Professor Feynman appears to 
be integrating notions borrowed from ecological and engineering defini-
tions. The adaptive qualities of resilience are essential in this case to 
providing strong, stable and consistent containment. In this case, resilience 
is closer to the engineering definition of resilience, focusing on efficiency, 
constancy and predictability. On the other hand, the qualities of eco-
logical resistance are also involved since the reaction to change is crucial 
in that it was discovered that though the O-rings were not initially designed 
to expand that under pressure, in previous launches the metal bent and 
the rubber expanded (a process known as extrusion) to seal the O-ring. 
While this was not how the O-rings were designed to function, this is 
how they functioned in flight conditions. This is analogous to the need 
to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change.35
The above examples make it clear that the primary problem of risk 
lies in the choices to be made by the risk decision makers, not in the 
management of risk already taken. By focusing on the term “manage-
ment”, one takes for granted that a risk must exist in the first place and 
needs only to be managed. In the case of the O-rings, and the escape 
systems, there was no need for this risk to exist in the first place. There 
are important lessons to be learned for the management of other wide-risk 
technological systems.
35 Cf., Mary Comerio, Resilience.
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RISk HEEDING: EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND ETHICAL FALLACIES
In the case of any possible locus of disaster, warnings and the heed-
ing of notifications of risk are of paramount importance.36 It is impor-
tant to take note of epistemological and ethical fallacies when it comes 
to arguments of why warnings are not sufficiently heeded. In the case 
of the Challenger disaster, nothing should blind us to the point that 
the most senior engineer involved was keenly aware of the fatal risk 
involved and sent red-flagged warnings to this effect. That these warn-
ings were not heeded is sometimes obscured with the “argument” that 
one cannot hold up actions to be taken on the basis of warnings since 
every possible action will always have risks and it is next to impossible 
to take note of every single warning that comes across one’s desk. The 
existence of warnings that cannot supposedly be noticed is referred to 
under the hypothesis of “weak signals”.37 The hypothesis of “weak 
signals” is offered up as a rationale why warnings cannot always be 
heeded.
This “weak signals” hypothesis is easily refuted when one considers 
the source, the content and the form of the signals. One source of the 
signal in this case is the most senior engineer who knows the most about 
the O-rings. (Other well-informed engineers joined in.) It is not a crank 
call made by a tourist to the information center at the space center. The 
source in this case was the project’s senior engineer himself. It was a 
warning from the inside, by an insider, who knew the most about the 
technology about which he was issuing the warning.
The content of the signal warns of the danger being fatal to all aboard. 
There is no weakness in terms of the content of the message. In Boisjoly’s 
famous memorandum of July 31, 1985, he warned before the fact that if 
there were a launch, “The result would be a catastrophe of the highest 
order – loss of human life.” In his earlier warning of July 22, 1985, he 
warned of a horrifying flight failure unless a solution were implemented 
36 A useful site for hazard early warning information is available from the “Disas-
ter Risk Management for Health Fact Sheets,” Global Platform, May 2011, accessed 
September 15, 2015, http://www.who.int/hac/events/drm_fact_sheet_early_warn-
ing_natural_hazards.pdf
37 The hypothesis of “weak signals” to describe the warnings of the failure of the 
O-rings was put forward by Diane Vaughan in her book, The Challenger Launch 
Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA.
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to prevent O-ring erosion.38 One can readily see that there is no mincing 
of words to minimize the possibility that the danger might be understood 
to be less than absolutely extraordinary. The consequences in terms of 
life and death danger are spelled out in detail. The specific risk factor is 
named. One could not possibly ask for a stronger signal.
In terms of the form of the “weak signals” hypothesis, it should be 
noted that when it came to the timing of the launch, 14 managers and 
engineers alike unanimously voted against it.39 One could not conceive 
of a stronger signal than this. That this decision was overturned in an 
off-line thirty-five minute caucus by 4 Morton Thiokol managers (with 
no engineers on line who were not managers i.e., Lund, who was both 
manager and engineer, allowed to participate in the closed off-line caucus) 
does not take away from the fact that these 4 managers were fully aware 
of the previous signal of unanimous vote of 14 engineers and managers 
against the launch.40 There is no possibility that the signals sent were not 
the strongest possible signals available. It is important to remember that 
while all 14 were privy to most of the teleconference, that the fateful 
decision to launch was made during the thirty-five minute off-net caucus 
to which only the 4 managers were privy. The engineers who were not 
privy to this decision had no part in writing the recommendation to 
launch and refused to sign it. These engineers did not change from their 
original recommendation not to launch. During this long passage of 
time, changes in the content of the putty were implemented.
THE RIGHT TO MAkE DECISIONS OvER OTHERS’ LIFE AND DEATH
What if we leave the decision to launch to the astronauts themselves 
and make sure that they are fully informed of the dangers? (For the sake 
of this discussion, we omit the fact that there were two civilian passengers 
aboard). The crew, who perceive themselves as heroes, are likely to decide 
38 Saving Human Lives: Lessons in Management Ethics, p. 170. Cf., Investiga-
tion of the Challenger Accident, Report of the Committee on Science and Technol-
ogy, House of Representatives, Ninety-Ninth Congress, 2nd Session, Union Calendar 
No. 600, House Report 99-1016, Washington, D. C., GPO, 1986, p. 285. This 
memorandum is blotted out so as to be virtually illegible.
39 Ibid., pp. 174, 195.
40 Ibid., for an extended analysis of the unsound and unethical decision making 
process engaged in by the four middle managers.
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to launch. When I had the privilege to personally interview Kathyrn 
Cordell Thornton, the celebrated astronaut who was part of the 100 
strong astronaut corps at the time of the Challenger, and then Director 
of the Center for Science, Mathematics and Engineering Education at the 
University of Virginia, we discussed this very issue. I recall her saying 
that, ‘if these astronauts had refused to go up, there would be 100 others 
behind them waiting to take their place.’ This is not surprising when one 
considers the peer expectations of that kind of group. There is a psycho-
logical expectation that they should be fearless. This is no different from 
football players going into the field with a head injury. The question now 
has become, does one have a right to take a risk with one’s own life? One 
could say that this is a matter of individual choice. But, is it? One must 
take into account the circumstances that make up the context in which 
the choice is to be made. Such circumstances include peer pressure, job 
pressure, expectations of the kind of risk the risk taker is “supposed” to 
be taking in the concrete situation. The real problem lies with the risk 
makers, those who place the risk takers in the situations in which lethal 
risks are being taken. The shuffle of responsibility to those who take the 
risks from those who create the risks relieves the risk makers of ethical 
responsibility.
Ultimately, the deciders, those who are taking the risk of other 
people’s lives in their own hands, have the responsibility of not risking 
other people’s lives. It is as simple as this. There is no such thing as an 
ethical choice to risk another person’s life when it is not necessary in 
the service of life without first obtaining prior consent. If managers do 
so on account of cost-saving, they are making unethical choices if we 
define the basic principle of ethics to value human life as the highest 
priority. Needless to say, matters are different in the case of the military 
in which case prior consent has been implicitly given when one has 
become a soldier. Then, a general can order soldiers into combat zones 
in which their lives are placed in jeopardy. But, in these cases, prior 
consent has been obtained. In these cases, in any case, the general’s 
commands are in the service of life in the sense that the war or battle 
being fought is, presumably in the service of the lives whom the soldiers 
are fighting to protect.
We should not leave the discussion of this one classic example without 
mentioning that the astronauts and the civilians aboard could have eas-
ily been provided with proper space suits, parachutes and ejection chairs 
had the shuttle been designed for them. No one died as a result of the 
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explosion. Horrifically, all died because of too fast a collision with the 
ocean. All were breathing until ocean contact. It is important to empha-
size that the crew and the passengers were alive, were conscious after 
the spectacular explosion. During their three minute descent, some crew 
members had actually activated and used their emergency air packs. One 
can only ponder the living terror that those horrifying three minutes 
gave to those seven people, fully aware of their imminent death. What 
mental suffering those human beings endured! That such a provision of 
space suits, parachutes and ejection chairs were considered and then re-
jected by management is another unethical decision that resulted not in 
the safe abortion of the mission, but in the unimaginably horrific deaths 
of every person aboard. Earlier spacecraft had been equipped with launch 
escape systems, thus proving that escape systems were not only possible, 
but were actual. The decision not to equip the Challenger with an abort 
system was not a decision based on possibility, but a decision based 
on policy. This death, or should it be said, manslaughter of the astronauts 
and passengers, was not the result of high-risk technology, but the result 
of a cost-benefit analysis that did not follow a safety first priority. This 
horrific outcome was the result of risky and unethical decision making, 
of unethical risk assessment. This risk did not have to exist in the first 
place. It was a management decision that decided not to include these 
safety precautions: it was risk assessment that did not take into account 
the value of human life. (All earlier and all later missions were equipped 
with abort systems).
fINal coNsIDeratIoNs
THE RIGHT TO MAkE DECISIONS OvER OTHER’S LIFE AND DEATH
We are normative beings. What this means is that we are capable of 
analyzing our behavior in moral terms. It is difficult to provide an exam-
ple of when we are not aware of when we or others are operating in ways 
which we consider to be unethical. If such an example could be found, it 
is always possible to argue that we should have been so aware. For exam-
ple, while much has been made of the idea that moral norms are cultur-
ally variable, it is difficult if not impossible to find an example of a culture 
that does not follow some version of the Golden Rule, that harm-doing 
to others is not acceptable except in certain specialized cases, such as self-
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defense.41 While what constitutes harm to others may involve some 
cultural variance, in fact, it is easier to find commonalities of what is 
considered harm-doing than it is to find differences.42 When we are con-
sidering the countries in which man-made disasters occur, especially those 
involving wide-risk technologies, there is a basic agreement about what 
constitutes harm-doing/harm-allowing and hence unethical behavior.
There is some degree of resistance to the introduction of humanistic 
concerns to what have traditionally been conceived of as technologically 
driven organizations. What is needed is more adaptive resilience on the 
part of technocrats and bureaucrats to allow the soft data of ethics to 
penetrate into the engineering, political or management arena. When the 
decision of whether or not one should locate the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Reactor near to the Ocean was being made, what was lacking 
was not the hard data of science, but the soft data of ethics.
We have also learned that the alleged hard data of risk assessment is 
sometimes based on fantasy such as the odds predicting the failure of the 
loss of a space shuttle and the odds of a nuclear core melt disaster. One 
of the problems is that risk assessment has not been scientific enough in 
its methodology. It is hoped that some of these ideas can also be applied 
to the important area of reducing the risks of the harmful consequences 
of disasters.43 In addition, according to the International Red Cross, the 
traditional focus of the health sector has been on response and recovery 
and there is a need to broaden that focus to include prevention and miti-
gation and to develop community capacities.44 Thus, when calculating 
the risks of the movement of elderly populations in the case of the Fuku-
shima Daiichi nuclear reactor disaster, one can take soft data into account. 
41 Robert Elliott Allinson, ‘The Negative Formulation of the Golden Rule in 
Confucius’, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 12, no. 3, September, 1985.
42 1988: (ed. with Shu-hsien Liu), Harmony and Strife: Contemporary Perspec-
tives, East and West, cloth-bound, Chinese University Press, 1988, pp. 336. 
43 A useful example of such an application is found in Muhammed Tariq, Saif Ul-
lah Khan and Zahid Pahman, ‘Evaluation of Disaster Prevention and Management: 
A Comprehensive Case of Haiti and Pakistan,’ Interdisciplinary Journal of Contem-
porary Research in Business,’ Vol 3, No 5, September 2011, China has also made 
significant improvement in their disaster management approach. Cf., accessed September 
15, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-05/11/content_11351284.htm
44 “Humanitarian Health Action: Disaster Risk Management for Health Facts 
Sheet,” World Health Organization, accessed September 15, 2015, http://www.who.
int/hac/techguidance/preparedness/factsheets/en/
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One must ethically assess that it will be more difficult to move elderly 
people to new homes without harmful effects. Shashnawa Ali, head of 
climate change and disaster resilience for Islamic relief Bangladesh, em-
phasizes the need to give poorer countries a fighting chance by taking 
measures such as rebuilding flood-prone houses on higher grounds.45 This 
demonstrates the importance of prior ethical calculations which reveals 
the importance of applying the ideas developed here to the important 
areas of risk reduction management to cope with the situations that arise 
once a disaster has occurred.46 In terms of monetary factors, research from 
the U.S. government shows that one dollar of money spent on risk reduc-
tion saves fifteen dollars in disaster relief.47
It is a pity that it takes a great disaster to awaken the need for preven-
tion. Thailand now has the best tsunami warning system in Asia but it 
took the horrific toll of human lives to bring this about.48 Ethics, which 
represents the core of the soft data of the humanities, is at the bottom of 
45 Mark Tran, “UN urged to create global fund for disaster prevention,” The 
Guardian, October 1, 2012, accessed September 15, 2015, http://www.theguardian.
com/global-development/2012/oct/01/call-for-global-fund-disaster-prevention
46 A clear account of the approach of reducing the consequences of disasters is given 
in the United Nations Development Programme for Indonesia. This is important since 
Indonesia is one of the most disaster prone areas in the world. Cf., accessed September 
15, 2015, http://www.undp.or.id/programme/cpr/, The Government of India/
United Nations Development Programme on Natural Disaster Risk Management in-
cludes specifics such as training masons and engineers to construct earthquake resistant 
houses. Cf., accessed September 15, 2015, http://saarc-sdmc.nic.in/pdf/india/file5.pdf
Vietnam is another example of one of the most disaster prone areas in the 
world. Their handbook on disaster management shows an awareness of the need 
to extend communication down to village and commune levels. Cf., accessed 
September 15, 2015, http://www.coe-dmha.org/Publications/cdr_handbooks/
Vietnam_DisasterResponse_Handbook2012.pdf.Thailand is also making progress 
especially after the 2004 Tsunami. Cf., accessed September 15, 2015, http://www.
jica.go.jp/english/our_work/evaluation/tech_and_grant/project/term/asia/
c8h0vm000001rr8t-att/thai_2008_02.pdf
47 Mark Tran, “UN urged to create global fund for disaster prevention,” The 
Guardian, October 1, 2012, accessed September 15, 2015, http://www.theguardian.
com/global-development/2012/oct/01/call-for-global-fund-disaster-prevention
48 “Survivors of 2004 tsunami left horrified after being ‘ambushed’ by trailer for 
movie about Boxing Day tragedy,” Daily Mail, December 25, 2012, accessed Septem-
ber 15, 2015, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2253133/Boxing-Day-
Tsunami-Survivors-2004-tsunami-left-horrified-ambushed-trailer-movie-Boxing-Day-
tragedy.html
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and motivates all efforts at reducing the harmful effects of disasters, for 
what we are all most concerned about is preventing and reducing harm 
to our fellow human beings. This analysis has underscored the importance 
of preventing disasters from occurring in the first place. This notion of 
prior prevention is key especially when one considers the prospect of 
mega-disasters in the face of which even the best of risk reduction manage-
ment measures may prove ineffective. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
reactor disaster may only be an early warning signal of such mega-disasters 
that might be on the horizon. In the end, prevention may be our only 
answer. The ethical behavior of human beings is not a luxury; in today’s 
world, it is a necessity.
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